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ABSTRACT European Union (EU) implementation research has neglected situations when 
member states go beyond the minimum requirements prescribed in EU directives (gold-
plating). The top-down focus on compliance insufficiently accounts for the fact that positive 
integration actually allows member states to transcend the EU’s requirements to facilitate 
context-sensitive problem-solving. This study adopts a bottom-up implementation 
perspective. Moving beyond compliance, it introduces the concept of ‘customization’ to 
depict how transposition results in tailor-made solutions in a multi-level system. The study 
analyzes the hitherto unexplored veterinary drug regulations of four member states. Using 
fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis and formal theory evaluation, this paper assesses 
how policy and country-level factors interact. Results reveal the countries’ different 
customization styles. The latter simultaneously reflect the interplay of domestic politics with 
institutions, and the ‘fit’ of EU regulatory modes with domestic, sectoral interventionist 
styles. Compliance approaches cannot fully explain these fine-grained patterns of 
Europeanization. 
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Introduction 
‘The European experience shows that far‐reaching economic integration can be achieved 
without suppressing cultural diversity and legitimate differences in national preferences.’ 
Giandomenico Majone (1999: 309). 
 
This paper analyzes how European Union (EU) member states adapt EU directives to 
domestic contexts during transposition. European integration entails that member states 
transfer their autonomy to a common institutional framework to allow for common policies. 
To account for domestic circumstances, EU directives then delegate some decision-making 
processes to the transposing countries (Treib 2014). The resulting diversity of domestic 
policies is studied by legal Europeanization scholars, who view transposition as a mechanism 
by which EU law impacts domestic regulations (Börzel and Risse 2012; Töller 2010). EU 
implementation research has strongly emphasized the degree of (non-)compliance with EU 
directives, the timeliness and correctness of transposition, the amount of non-compliance and 
transposition rates (Toshkov 2010). Despite their variety and sophistication (Angelova et al. 
2012), the concepts and explanations that have been proposed for transposition outcomes 
commonly focus on compliance, asking whether or not the translation into domestic law 
conforms to the EU directive (Treib 2014). 
Some argue that ‘this focus insufficiently captures the implications of member states being 
part of a multi-level system’ (Schmidt 2008: 299). The question of compliance corresponds to 
a top-down view of implementation as hierarchical guidance. Although highly relevant, this 
approach ‘tends to prejudge the EU as the main source of domestic change’ (Börzel and Risse 
2012: 2). By contrast, bottom-up perspectives view implementation as decentralized problem-
solving. Europeanization becomes the application of common solutions to shared problems, 
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tailor-made to domestic circumstances (Pülzl and Treib 2007). The analytic focus shifts 
toward the ‘conditions [under which] directives do or do not allow for continuing national 
heterogeneity’ (Töller 2010: 429) to facilitate context-sensitive problem-solving.  
When member states go beyond the minimum requirements of European legislation - named 
‘gold-plating’- they are typically considered to hamper the enabling of markets. According to 
a widespread ‘no gold-plating’ policy, implementation should be restricted to what is 
necessary to comply with the EU’s minimum requirements (Morris 2011; Voermans 2009). 
Notwithstanding this, market-correcting measures allow member states to go further than the 
EU’s minimum requirement (Jans et al. 2009). Reconciling integration with differences in 
national preferences fosters the EU’s capacity to respond to the countries’ cultural diversity 
(Majone 1999), and enables countries to respond to domestic circumstances. The top-down 
focus on compliance and negative integration neglects this bottom-up aspect of the ‘European 
experience’ (ibid). Previous studies have therefore not addressed this phenomenon extensively 
(Voermans 2009).  
This study moves beyond compliance (Schmidt 2008) and asks: how and why do fully 
compliant countries ‘customize’ EU directives? As the focus is on customization, this is hence 
not a compliance study. Customization refers to the additional regulatory density and 
stringency of the domestic regulations compared to the market-correcting EU directive (Knill 
et al. 2012). The paper expands Europeanization research to a new sector (Angelova et al. 
2012). It draws on original data on veterinary drug regulations in France, the United Kingdom 
(UK), Germany and Austria as comparable and likely cases for customization. These 
countries all comply with the EU’s rules to ensure the safety and exportability of their food 
products (Sager et al. 2011). However, the domestic regulations differ considerably in the 
degree to which they transcend the EU directive.  
Using fuzzy-set qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin 2000) to account for 
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interactions, several propositions derived from compliance arguments on how the interplay 
between policy and country-level factors affects customization are formally evaluated. Results 
show that discretion matters and specify the conditions under which institutions mediate the 
consideration of domestic players’ interests during transposition. Simultaneously, countries 
reinterpret EU directives depending on the ‘fit’ of EU regulatory modes with domestic, 
sectoral interventionist styles. Compliance approaches cannot fully explain these more fine-
grained Europeanization patterns. 
I now define the novel ‘customization’ concept. Subsequently, I discuss prominent 
implementation arguments to derive conditions for customization and hypotheses about their 
interplay. I then outline the research design before presenting my results, based on which I 
evaluate the hypotheses and conclude.  
 
Defining customization  
Diverse approaches of problem-solving are an intended result of decentralized 
implementation structures (Majone 1999; Treib 2014). However, the remaining differences 
within the boundaries left by EU law have seldom received attention as a transposition 
outcome (Falkner et al. 2005: 140-159; Töller 2010). Gold-plating refers to the ‘non-literal’, 
as opposed to ‘literal’, interpretation of EU directives (Steunenberg 2007). It denotes all 
instances where at the national level more is being regulated than strictly required, by 
extending the scope, not taking full advantage of derogations, retaining higher domestic 
standards or implementing ‘too’ early (Jans et al. 2009). Case study evidence from the 
Netherlands and the UK suggests that environmental directives are rarely gold-plated (Jans et 
al. 2009; Morris 2011; Voermans 2009).  
The term gold-plating has two weaknesses. First, it blurs the conceptual distinction between 
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changes in policy outputs concerning the regulatory density or the policy’s stringency (Knill 
and Lenschow 1998; Knill et al. 2012). Second, by including both the early implementation 
and the non-literal interpretation of EU directives in the definition, gold-plating has not been 
clearly demarcated from non-compliance. Gold-plating thus retains a top-down connotation of 
unnecessary and potentially problematic ‘over-implementation’ (Falkner et al. 2005; Kaeding 
2008; Mastenbroek 2005).  
However, in market-correcting domains, minimum harmonization essentially means that the 
member states may further interpret the EU’s minimum requirement, except under conditions 
of full standardization (Jans et al. 2009; Voermans 2009). From a bottom-up perspective, 
countries ‘customize’ EU directives. Customization occurs when compliant countries use their 
leeway to adapt EU rules to domestic particularities. The transposing body might also 
consciously leave pre-existing domestic policies unchanged, if they conform to the EU policy 
(Treib 2014). Customization means the degree to which the domestic regulations complement 
the EU directive with more or stricter rules than required. Customization can manifest itself as 
gold-plating (except for early implementation), but has two dimensions (Knill et al. 2012). 
Customization can refer to the formal regulatory density of the domestic regulations. Density 
means the amount of additional rules that concretize the EU directive (‘level of detail’; 
Versluis 2003). Stringency depicts the substantial additional restrictiveness of the domestic 
rule. Restrictiveness means the number of additional restrictions of the substantial freedom 
left to policy addressees in personal, substantive, or temporal scope (Knill et al. 2012).  
Transposition studies usually aggregate outcomes at the level of directives (Angelova et al. 
2012). However, directives regulate diverse issues, which typically address different target 
groups and subsectors and are transposed into different national legislations, sometimes by 
several legislative bodies. Hence, single issues are a more relevant unit of analysis than 
directives (Toshkov 2010). I use the terms ‘regulations’ or ‘policies’ interchangeably to 
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denote a set of techniques by which public actors ‘wield their power in attempting to ensure 
support and effect or prevent social change’ concerning a specific issue (Vedung 1998: 21).  
Extensive customization does not indicate non-compliance with EU law. Customization 
presupposes full adoption (timely or not) and then depicts the additional density and /or 
restrictiveness of the domestic regulations. Member states just go further than the EU in 
applying a market-correcting solution – for example, by additionally restricting the use of 
antibiotics for livestock to fight antibiotic resistance. Similarly, the limited customization of 
EU directives does not imply ‘more’ compliance. Instead, this entails that EU minimum 
requirements were simply adopted without changes – for example, by complying with, but not 
transcending the EU’s minimum requirement to not use more antibiotics than needed for an 
adequate treatment.  
There is at best inconclusive evidence that the substantive fit of European with national 
policies1 dominantly explains domestic responses (e.g., Falkner et al. [2005]; Knill and 
Lehmkuhl [2002]; Mastenbroek [2005]; Mastenbroek and Kaeding [2006]; Toshkov [2010]; 
for a different view, see Angelova et al. [2012]; Steunenberg and Toshkov [2009]). The 
customization concept integrates this insight by conceiving the closeness of domestic policies 
to the EU template as an outcome rather than an input of transposition. Adapting existing 
‘goodness of fit’ measures to customization, the data point is no longer prior to, but after 
transposition. I adopt Knill and Lehmkuhl’s (2002) distinction of ‘institutional compatibility’ 
to measure the extent of occurred (as opposed to required) domestic changes in policies (as a 
subset of domestic arrangements) in response to EU policies. Each domestic regulation is 
classified according to whether changes in comparison to the EU policy are absent (0), 
relatively moderate (1) or extensive (2) concerning a) density and b) intensity. Moderate 
changes usually entail 1, and extensive, 2 or more changes. 2 
Austria for instance concretizes the abovementioned EU requirement by restricting the use of 
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antibiotics to maximally one month (1 additional rule, 1 additional restriction). These two 
dimensions are added into a customization index. Only with extensive changes in both 
dimensions, customization is fully extensive (4). For customization to be more extensive than 
limited, at least moderate changes in both dimensions, or moderate changes in one dimension, 
but extensive changes in the other, are required (2 or 3). If only one dimension entails 
moderate changes (1), then customization is more limited than extensive. Without any 
changes, customization is fully absent (0).  
 
Explaining customization 
Top-down perspectives assume a direct link between European policies and domestic 
outcomes (Pülzl and Treib 2007). Bottom-up arguments have shifted the attention to country-
level factors (Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006). Recent studies emphasize the complex causal 
interactions of structural and agency-related factors behind transposition (for recent overviews 
see Angelova et al. [2012]; Perkins and Neumayer [2007]; Toshkov [2010]; Treib [2014]). In 
this third tradition, I discuss how the interplay of both policy and domestic factors might 
affect customization (Di Lucia and Kronsell 2010; Steunenberg 2007). For the sake of 
cumulativeness, I revisit prominent compliance arguments potentially relevant for 
customization that received considerable and conclusive empirical support. Results will show 
whether they treat the distinct features of customization well.  
 
EU regulatory mode 
Regulatory leeway matters for implementation (Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009; Töller 2010). 
Knill and Lenschow (2003) distinguish EU governance modes through their level of 
obligation and the amount of discretion granted. Referring to the latter, inflexible instruments 
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in (by definition obligatory) directives entail detailed substantive or procedural rules. 
Conversely, flexible instruments in directives are legally binding, but define only broad goals, 
offer exemption and derogation possibilities or several policy options. Flexible instruments 
grant implementers more discretion than inflexible instruments to respond to domestic 
problem constellations (Treib et al. 2007). Vaguer measures provide domestic policy makers 
with opportunities to realize their interests. EU regulatory modes can thus be unresponsive to 
domestic adaptation (inflexible instruments), or display differing degrees or responsiveness 
(flexible instruments). Discretion intuitively appears a prerequisite for customization: 
 
H1: A responsive EU regulatory mode is a necessary condition for extensive customization.  
H2: Inflexible instruments are typically not or hardly customized.3 
 
However, flexible instruments might result due to member states defending their status quo 
during EU negotiations. Domestic policy diversity would then produce flexible instruments, 
and not vice versa. In contrast, the EU decision-making processes for the three directives 
under analysis were characterized by low politicization and a widespread need for 
harmonization.4 
 
Issue salience  
Given the enormous number of EU directives, domestic actors pick and choose where to focus 
their attention (Versluis 2003). Less salient regulations are ignored (Knill and Lenschow 
1998; Toshkov 2010) and thus rather not customized. Salience refers to the visibility of and 
the importance attached to a topic, the main indicator being public attention. Salience can 
indicate either the high importance of a policy or its political contestation (Versluis 2003).  
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Domestic resistance 
EU policies may lead to political struggles between domestic players (Falkner et al. 2005; 
Knill and Lenschow 1998; Mastenbroek 2005; Treib 2014). Domestic opposition 
(Steunenberg 2007; Toshkow 2010) should foster differentiated domestic rules designed to 
meet the stakeholders’ needs. Or this can lead to more restrictive rules, if the opposition 
deems the EU policy too lax. Resistance means that at least one main target group with some 
power to influence domestic policy-making with resources and/or lobbying activities opposes 
the EU policy.  
 
Institutions 
Institutional veto points are stages in the decision-making process on which, and institutional 
veto players individual or collective actors whose, agreement is formally required for 
transposition. Such institutions empower or constrain administrative, societal and political 
actors to pursue their interests (Mastenbroek 2005; Treib 2014; Tsebelis 1995). This should 
facilitate an extensive customization (Falkner et al. 2005). Policy-specific consultation 
processes without parliamentary involvement serve the same function (Steunenberg 2007; 
Töller 2010). I define veto points as the combination of the degree of decentralization 
(Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006; Versluis 2003), bicameralism, and corporatism. Since 
transposition often bypasses the political arena, corporatism becomes as important as 
decentralization and bicameralism.  
Arguments that ‘bring domestic politics back in’ (Mastenbroek 2005: 1110) emphasize the 
interplay of domestic interests and institutions. Domestic opposition can only be influential 
when institutions do not effectively shelter the policy-making body from societal demands 
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(Haverland 2000; Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009; Toshkov 2010). Both opposed 
stakeholders and institutional veto players are more likely to promote their interests in the 
context of salient issues (Angelova et al. 2012: 1284; Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006: 341). 
A ‘domestic politics’ hypothesis follows: 
 
H3: Salient issues are typically customized extensively when they are opposed domestically 
and numerous veto points or veto players prevail. 
  
Domestic, sectoral interventionist styles 
 Administrative bodies as policy makers conduct a large part of the transposition process 
(Steunenberg 2007; Töller 2010). ‘Constructivist’ arguments assume that these bodies follow 
a logic of appropriateness, hence acting in accordance with rules and practices that are 
socially constructed and anticipated and associate particular identities to particular situations 
(March and Olsen 1998). EU policies may or may not ‘fit’, i.e. be compatible with 
domestically held (regulatory) identities. Local administrations (re)interpret the overarching 
norm to ensure that it fits their identities (Börzel and Risse 2012; Falkner et al. 2005; 
Mastenbroek 2005; Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006).  
Mastenbroek and Kaeding (2006: 344-45) argue that when following a logic of 
appropriateness, member states conform to habits, i.e. patterns of behavior acquired by 
frequent repetition. What matters is thus ‘not the fit [of EU policies] with the status quo, but 
the fit with the domestic belief system underlying that status quo’ (ibid: 345). Referring to the 
latter, Perkins and Neumayer (2007) suggest that the policymaking preferences of national 
governments matter (see also Di Lucia and Kronsell [2010]; Treib [2014: 18]). In my analysis 
I am particularly interested in patterns of established state-society relations (Treib 2014: 24). 
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Domestic, sectoral interventionist styles represent such habits concerning the relationship 
between state and individuals, which manifests itself in the use of coercion through policy 
instruments (Sager 2009).  
Vedung (1998) distinguishes policy instruments formally by the degree of authoritative force 
exercised by the governor on target populations. ‘Sticks’ are authoritative regulations where 
the governed is obligated to comply. ‘Carrots’ are non-compulsory (dis)incentives for an 
action by allocation or deprivation of material resources. ‘Sermons’ are voluntary means of 
information. The countries’ sectoral interventionist styles are expressed through the average 
degree of coerciveness of, i.e. the relative prevalence of sermons, carrots and sticks in, the 
transposing domestic veterinary drugs regulations (Sager 2009). In highly Europeanized 
countries, domestic interventionist styles partly reflect, but can go greatly beyond the degree 
of coerciveness of the EU’s minimum requirements. Similarly, the sector under analysis was 
largely unregulated domestically before the EU directives were issues. The underlying 
measurement hypothesis is that the countries’ habits of exerting coercion are relatively stable 
over time; thus, present levels of coerciveness also reflect general tendencies of coerciveness 
(March and Olsen 1998). 
EU regulatory modes, customization and domestic, sectoral interventionist styles reflect the 
degree of state intervention as ‘the quintessence of government’ (Sager 2009: 537) from 
differing angles. The flexibility of EU instruments concerns the relationship between the EU 
and both member states and target groups. The interventionist styles are an aggregated 
measure of national policy-making preferences, referring to the formal question whether the 
final target groups have a choice to comply or not. Finally, the restrictiveness dimension of 
customization captures the substantive, additional stringency of single domestic regulations 
as compared to the directive. Domestic, sectoral interventionist styles and customization are 
thus not tautological concepts. 5 For instance, all countries define obligatory ‘sticks’ for 
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documenting veterinary drug dispensing. However, these sticks are not more restrictive than 
the strict EU template.  
Regarding the degree of state intervention, EU regulatory modes can more or less ‘fit’ 
domestic, sectoral interventionist styles. This (mis)fit might affect customization. Flexible 
instruments are minimally authoritative. By contrast, a coercive interventionist style imposes 
a high degree of obligation on the governed. Hence, to reduce the distance between the two, 
flexible instruments might be customized into a more restrictive version. Conversely, a non-
coercive interventionist style favors rules that only minimally limit individual choices. Since 
inflexible instruments already pose considerable limits on individual freedom, adding 
restrictiveness would not fit the country’s interventionist style. Two last hypotheses capture 
the logic of appropriateness: 
 
H4: Countries with a coercive interventionist style typically customize flexible instruments 
extensively. 
H5: Countries with a non-coercive interventionist style typically customize inflexible 
instruments to a limited degree. 
 
Data 
The domestic regulations of single issues in a market-correcting sector serve as the units of 
analysis for customization. I now discuss why the sector of veterinary drugs regulations is 
illustrative, the policy issues of dispensing and administration are likely cases, and the 
countries France, UK, Germany and Austria are comparable cases for customization. 
Europeanization research needs to expand to new policy sectors (Angelova et al. 2012). 
Veterinary drug regulations are both under-researched and a particularly illustrative example 
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of positive integration. Scandals related to animal diseases like bluetongue and antibiotic 
resistance have triggered public awareness about the importance of food safety. Veterinary 
drug regulations crucially correct these failures in the European single market for food 
products. The regulations ensure animal health and food safety across borders by preventing 
and managing animal diseases and antibiotic residues in food. Ensuring the exportability of 
their food products is essential for the countries. Thus compliance with the EU directives, a 
prerequisite for customization, is generally given (Sager et al. 2014). 
Veterinary drugs are dispensed by veterinarians or pharmacies to the end users – veterinarians 
or livestock farmers – who administer the drug to the livestock. Contrary to marketing 
authorization or food processing, these ‘on the ground’ processes do not immediately intersect 
with the transboundary single markets for pharmaceutical or food products. This makes 
standardization unlikely and customization likely with these regulations. In this population, all 
possible cases for customization are analyzed: 13 regulations of dispensing and 6 policies of 
administration, which are a) regulated in an EU directive, b) not instances of full 
standardization, and c) distinguishable from other processes. The EU policies (10 flexible and 
9 inflexible instruments) stem from three directives: Council Directive 90/167/EEC on 
medicated feedingstuffs, Directive 2001/82/EC on veterinary medicinal products and 
Commission Directive 2006/130/EC on the prescription requirements (table B1, online 
appendix). 
The more contextually similar the analyzed countries are, the more potential intervening 
factors can be controlled for (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). I compare the domestic regulations of 
Austria, Germany, France and the UK in 2011 (N = 76). These countries share a tendency 
toward low compliance (Falkner et al. 2005), similar regulatory contexts and functional 
problems. Food safety scandals triggered the relevance of veterinary drug regulations, and 
livestock farming has a similar significance for agriculture: the value added to the gross 
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domestic product by agriculture was between 1 and 4.7, but below EU average in 2000. All 
domestic regulations analyzed here were subject to extensive revisions since the EU directives 
were issued (Sager et al. 2011: 301-302). 
The original case study evidence for this study was collected for the Swiss Federal Office of 
Public Health (Sager et al. 2011). Methods comprised an analysis of legal documents, policy 
documents, secondary literature, telephone interviews and written questionnaires with agents 
of relevant stakeholder groups and the public administration.  
 
Method 
I apply Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Ragin 2000)  to identify necessary 
conditions and sufficient combinations of conditions for customization, subsequently called 
configurations, scenarios or paths. QCA allows for conjunctural causality, i.e. for the effect of 
a single condition to unfold in combination with other conditions, as hypothesized. The notion 
of equifinality then captures that the customization of EU policies may have several, mutually 
non-exclusive, context-dependent explanations (Perkins and Neumayer 2007). The 
assumption of causal asymmetry entails that extensive customization can be explained 
differently than limited customization (Di Lucia and Kronsell 2010; Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012: 78).  
QCA understands variables as sets in which every case has a certain membership. The 
calibration process entails the definition of anchors for set membership, based on theoretical 
and substantive knowledge. Fuzzy sets allow for degrees of (non-)membership scores. These 
can vary between full membership (score 1, e.g. extensive customization) and full non-
membership (score 0, e.g. no customization). The dichotomous difference ‘in kind’ is 
indicated by the crossover point (score 0.5). Values above 0.5 indicate that a case is more a 
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member than a non-member in the set (e.g., rather or fully extensive customization), yet to 
differing degrees. Values below 0.5 indicate the opposite, e.g., rather or fully limited 
customization (Ragin 2000). 
The calibrated empirical data are then transferred into a truth table, the rows of which 
represent all logically possible combinations of conditions. If all or enough cases’ fuzzy set 
membership in a truth table row is smaller than or equal to its membership in the outcome, 
then the row is identified as a sufficient path for the outcome. The logical minimization 
procedure then reduces the complexity of all sufficient truth table rows to find the shortest 
possible causal expression for the combinations of conditions that imply the outcome, named 
solution term (Rihoux and Ragin 2009).  
FsQCA allows for certain probabilistic aspects. Consistency expresses the degree to which the 
empirical evidence is in line with the statement of sufficiency or necessity. Consistency 
sufficiency can be indicated for truth table rows (raw consistency), single paths of, or the 
whole solution term. Coverage denotes how much of the observations are explained by the 
model. Raw coverage expresses how much of the outcome is covered by a single path, 
solution coverage does the same for the solution term, while unique coverage indicates how 
much a path covers alone. The basis on which appropriate levels for these measures (from 0-
1) are chosen should be research-specific. Consistency sufficiency should not be below 0.75. 
Raw consistency levels were chosen according to ‘gaps’ in the raw consistency values and the 
presence of contradictory cases (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 127f, 143ff). Contradictory 
cases are ‘more in than out’ in the set of explanatory factors, but ‘more out than in’ the 
outcome set; thus, the explanation was not sufficient for the outcome. 
I apply the Enhanced Standard Analysis procedure and rely on the intermediate solution term. 
I hence make theoretically informed directional expectations for single conditions, and I 
ensure that no combination of conditions is assumed to imply both extensive and limited 
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customization. Online appendix B displays the truth tables, the directional expectations, the 
complex and parsimonious solution terms, indications on limited diversity, untenable and 
simplifying assumptions (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 167-211). Results are illustrated 
with typical cases; space is too limited to discuss deviant cases.  
Online appendix A discusses the measurement and calibration. For CUSTOM, VPO, VPL and 
COERC, values of 0.05 and 0.95 already indicate full set (non-)membership. Online appendix 
D contains all databases, the raw data matrix and the fuzzy set scores. 
 
Results  
Administration policies tend to be more salient and disputed, but customized less extensively 
than dispensing policies. Figure 1 illustrates the diversity of the domestic settings. Values 
above 0.5 indicate that the specific feature is more often present than absent, and to which 
degree. The countries display different interventionist styles and ‘customization styles’. 
Austria and France are comparable. The policies typically face a rather low amount of 
domestic resistance. Austria, as a federal state, has many veto points but few veto players. The 
opposite is the case in the centralized state of France. In line with the two countries’ rather 
coercive interventionist traditions, the EU policies are rendered slightly more restrictive, but 
not differentiated extensively.  
 
--Insert figure 1 here-- 
 
Germany and the UK provide two almost ideal-typical counterexamples. The federal state of 
Germany is the only country where veterinary drug issues are highly salient and contested on 
average. Simultaneously many veto points and players prevail. In accordance with its highly 
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coercive interventionist style, Germany most often implements more restrictive domestic rules 
than necessary and differentiates EU directives. By contrast, in the centralized state of the UK 
domestic resistance tends to be rather limited and few veto points and players exist. 
Consistent with previous evidence (Jans et al. 2009; Morris 2011), the UK more rarely 
innovatively interprets and sometimes amends EU policies than the other countries, mainly to 
maintain its liberal regulatory approach that stresses individual responsibility, based on 
recommendations of good practice. 
No single necessary condition for the outcome was found (table B2, online appendix). 
Hypothesis 1 is thus refuted. Table 1 presents the four paths that imply extensive 
customization. I use capital letters if a feature is present and lower case letters for its absence. 
The * sign signifies ‘AND’, i.e. that several factors occur in conjunction. These paths are 
combined with the logical ‘OR’ ( + sign). The single cases that are explained by this solution, 
the consistency and coverage indicators for the single paths and the overall solution are listed 
below. Cases can display several paths. 
 
--Insert table 1 here-- 
 
In path one, a flexible instrument prevails (RESP), the issue is salient (SAL) and the country 
has a non-coercive interventionist style (coerc). This scenario is typical for the UK. For 
example, the EU’s general prescription requirement does not specify which actors can issue 
prescriptions. This issue became salient in 2003, when a report by the UK Competition 
Commission found monopolies in the supply of prescription drugs (Sager et al. 2011: 272). 
To enhance freedom of competition, the UK administration interpreted the EU rule creatively: 
Besides veterinarians, other actors were granted permission to prescribe certain categories of 
veterinary drugs.  
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In path two, flexible instruments (RESP) are customized, if the issue is both salient (SAL) and 
opposed (RES). One instance of this is the dispensing categories in Austria. The EU only 
broadly distinguishes prescription drugs from others. Austrian farmers are traditionally very 
influential and oppose restrictions of their freedom. In response, Austria has established a 
differentiated regulatory framework. The livestock owners retained an unusually generous 
access to veterinary drugs. However, this was coupled with information measures, educational 
and reporting requirements. 
The third scenario entails low issue salience (sal), a high number of veto players (VPL) and a 
coercive interventionist style (COERC). The numerous French authorities, for example, 
strongly emphasize police-patrol inspections. Therefore not only livestock holders must store 
the documentation of administration for five years (EU rule), but veterinarians, too. 
In path four, a responsive EU regulatory mode (RESP) does not fit the coercive interventionist 
style (COERC), combined with many veto points (VPO). One typical case is the permitted 
amount of drugs to be dispensed in Germany. The vague EU norm (amount needed for one 
treatment) clashes with Germany’s remarkably coercive strategy to prevent antibiotic 
resistance caused by the excessive use of antibiotics. German veterinarians firmly support this 
strategy. The decentralized, corporatist country extensively consults stakeholders during 
legislation. Unsurprisingly, Germany implemented a more precise and considerably stricter 
solution than the EU: veterinary drugs may be dispensed for 31 days of treatment, antibiotics 
only for 7 days. 
 
--Insert figure 2 here-- 
 
 
The solution has good consistency and coverage scores. None of the detected scenarios can 
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explain why EU policies were customized extensively in 12 out of 51 cases, situated in the 
upper left quadrant of figure 2. There are three contradictory cases. I discuss these issues in 
the concluding section.  
The four scenarios implying limited customization, reported in online appendix B, are not 
discussed in-depth, as the low solution coverage of 0.411 indicates a very limited ability to 
explain limited customization.  
 
Theory evaluation 
I now discuss the five hypotheses following Ragin’s principles of theory evaluation 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 295-305). The scenarios expected and those not are 
compared with the scenarios that were empirically (not) observed to answer three questions: 
first, which parts of the theory are supported by the findings? These are the areas shaded 
white in the tables 2 and 3 below. Second, in which direction should theory be expanded (grey 
areas)? Third, which parts of the theory need to be dropped (dark areas)? Online appendix C 
presents the underlying formal details. 
 
--Insert table 2 here— 
 
-- Insert table 3 here – 
 
The first key result is that discretion matters for customization (Steunenberg and Toshkov 
2009; Toshkov 2010). The presence of a flexible instrument alone is not a necessary condition 
for extensive customization. However, it is almost always part of the story (left part of table 
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2). Flexible instruments enable the transposing countries to adapt the policy to local 
circumstances as necessary. The lower left quadrant of table 3 shows that responsive EU 
instruments are not customized when low issue salience and resistance, few veto players and a 
non-coercive interventionist style prevail. The picture is less clear for inflexible instruments, 
whose presence alone is not sufficient for limited customization, as hypothesis 2 stated (upper 
left quadrant of table 3), and which are still quite often customized (upper right quadrant of 
table 3). Inflexible instruments are typically not customized only under certain circumstances, 
discussed below.  
Second, the results underscore the importance of domestic politics, but suggest their interplay 
with policy factors. Hypothesis 3 finds strong support: high numbers of veto points or players 
can foster the customization of strongly opposed and salient EU policies. Yet this is only the 
case when these policies are responsive (upper left quadrant of table 2). Results further reveal 
that a coercive interventionist style can replace veto points or veto players in this mechanism 
facilitating customization. Consider how France has dealt with the EU’s permission to specify 
conditions for the On-Farm Manufacturing of medicated feedingstuffs (OFM). OFM is highly 
salient in intensive farming and fiercely contested by French veterinarians. The French 
government views OFM as an extremely unsafe application route. OFM is now legally 
allowed, however de facto impossible due to numerous administrative hurdles (Sager et al. 
2014). This ‘refined domestic politics’ mechanism is, however, not the only path to extensive 
customization. 
In fact, third, the countries interpret EU norms depending on their fit with their domestic style 
of state intervention. Yet hypothesis 4 must be differentiated according to the upper left 
quadrant of table 2. A misfit between a flexible EU instrument and a coercive interventionist 
style effectively can imply extensive customization. This is true specifically when many veto 
points or veto players and low issue salience prevail, as Germany’s restrictive dispensing 
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policy illustrates. When inflexible EU instruments clashed with a non-coercive interventionist 
style, policies were indeed not further customized (upper left quadrant of table 3). However, 
hypothesis 5 only occurred in combination with few veto players and either strong domestic 
resistance, or low issue salience and many veto points. One instance of the first scenario is the 
EU Cascade rule, which considerably restricts the possibilities to treat rare maladies and 
species. As Austrian veterinarians fiercely resist the Cascade rule, the Austrian administration 
with its non-coercive interventionist style has only adopted it to the minimum. The second 
scenario was encountered e.g. when the averse-to-regulation UK administration simply 
‘copied’ the technical EU prescription form for medicated feedingstuffs. Hypothesis 5 also 
did not hold true in the context of high issue salience and low resistance (upper right quadrant 
of table 3).  
The lower left quadrant of table 2 reveals two unexpected pathways to extensive 
customization. Countries with a non-coercive interventionist style also differentiated flexible 
instruments concerning salient issues. This happened when either domestic resistance was low 
or few veto points and players prevailed. Austria, for instance, has defined detailed conditions 
under which the livestock owners can pursue OFM virtually without limitations - precisely to 
create derogations to maintain individual freedom. Unexpectedly, even inflexible instruments 
were customized extensively in combination with a coercive interventionist style (path 3, 
table 1). The upper right quadrant of table 3 further underscores the model’s limited and 
inconclusive explanatory power for limited customization. Clearly, the assessed compliance 
approaches cannot fully explain customization (lower right quadrants of tables 2 and 3). 
 
Conclusions 
The customization concept overcomes the conceptual shortcomings of the term ‘gold-plating’ 
and offers a differentiated bottom-up perspective on different ways EU member states 
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problem-solve (Pülzl and Treib 2007). It captures how transposition results in tailor-made 
solutions in a multi-level system (Schmidt 2008). Despite an apparent ‘no gold-plating policy’ 
in the EU (Jans et al. 2009) and the previously stated rareness of the phenomenon (Morris 
2011; Voermans 2009), results illustrate the considerable styles through which EU veterinary 
drugs directives are customized to fit domestic contexts. Germany, Austria, France and the 
UK issued market-correcting solutions that exceed the EU directive in their density or 
stringency (Knill et al. 2012) to secure animal health and food safety in the European single 
market.  
This study moves EU implementation and QCA research design forward in several ways. 
First, the customization concept offers an alternative way to measure how much European law 
influences national policy-making (Töller 2010). Second, relevant factors have proven to 
differ between single policy issues, rather than whole directives, as units of analysis (Toshkov 
2010). Third, this study expands implementation research to the veterinary drugs sector (Treib 
2014). Fourth, only the interplay between both policy-specific and country-level factors has 
aptly illuminated how EU policy structures national policy outcomes (Sager et al. 2014; 
Steunenberg 2007). Fifth, the findings indicate that domestic, sectoral interventionist styles 
matter for transposition (Perkins and Neumayer 2007; Vedung 1998). Finally, applying 
formal theory evaluation to assess set-theoretic hypotheses has considerably eased the results’ 
interpretation. 
The results suggest that to a limited extent, the EU can effectively steer how far countries 
depart from the EU template (Knill and Lenschow 2003; Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009; 
Treib et al. 2007). Findings support the ‘domestic politics’ hypothesis that domestic interests 
in interaction with institutions influence transposition, but delimit its scope to the presence of 
flexible EU instruments and salient issues (Falkner et al. 2005; Mastenbroek 2005; 
Steunenberg 2007; Versluis 2003). The study thus specifies conditions under which 
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institutions mediate the consideration of societal interests (Haverland 2000; Toshkov 2010). 
Simultaneously, I find considerable evidence that the customization of EU directives partly 
obeys a logic of appropriateness. The ‘fit’ between the styles of state intervention of the EU 
and the transposing countries provokes different domestic interpretations of EU directives 
(Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006). This happens in interaction with domestic political and 
institutional factors. The findings invite for a further exploration of the relationship between 
different logics of action of EU member states (March and Olsen 1998).  
Paradoxically, the arguments derived from compliance research have not been well suited to 
explain ‘compliance’ with the EU’s ‘no gold-plating’ policy. To gain a better understanding 
of this phenomenon, deviant cases should be explored more in-depth (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012). Possible explanations include EU decision-making processes (Töller 2010; 
Toshkov 2010), the domestic administrations’ substantive preferences, and implementation 
and enforcement mechanisms (Treib 2014; Versluis 2003). These factors were neglected in 
this study. This study is based on a purposive sample of market-correcting issues that 
illustrate customization. It deliberately applies a modest view on generalization (Rihoux and 
Ragin 2009): it remains to be tested whether the present results can travel to different policies 
or countries.  
The customization concept fruitfully sheds light on the aspect of diversity in what Majone 
(1999) called the ‘European experience’. We evidently need to move beyond compliance 
(Sager et al. 2014) to gain a fuller understanding of these often neglected, more fine-grained 
patterns of Europeanization. Diversity is inherent in multi-level governance. More research on 
the causes and implications of diversity for the policies’ later enforcement, application and 
effectiveness is needed to understand how shared policy problems are jointly resolved in the 
EU.  
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Notes 
                                                 
 
 
1 As opposed to indirect legal reform requirements (Treib 2014: 23-24). 
2 For policies that cannot meaningfully be adopted without amendments, these numbers were slightly adapted to 
ensure cross-case comparability and account for fine-grained cross-country differences.  
3 I hereafter interpret the term ‘typically’ as a consistent statement of sufficiency. 
4 Directive 90/167/EEC was amended as the European Parliament (EP) and the European Economic and Social 
Committee (EESC) without exemption urged for more precise rules, additional regulations, and more detailed 
definitions. The EP approved Directive 2001/82/EC without amendment; the EESC recommended to adopt 
current technical terminology. Commission Directive 2006/130/EC did not involve stakeholders (source: Eur-
Lex). 
5 Pearson’s R for interventionist styles and customization restrictiveness: 0.47 (r2=0.22); COERC and CUSTOM: 
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0.30 (r2=0.092). 
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Table 1: Sufficient conditions for extensive customization 
Solution  RESP*SAL*coerc + RESP*SAL*RES + sal*VPL*COERC+ RESP*VPO*COERC     CUSTOM 
Single case 
coverage 
AU:a4 
UK:d2,6,7,10,12,
13,a4  
AU:d2,6,7  
FR:d1,2,10,a4,5 
GE:d2,4,7,10,a4 
UK:d2,6,12 
FR:d6,7,9, 
12,13,a1,3, 
d4,8 
GE:d6,12,13, a1 
AU:d1,2,4,6,7, 
10,12,13 
GE:d1,2,4,6,7,10,
12,13,a4,5 
 
 
Consistency 0.887 0.880 0.826 0.903  
Raw coverage 0.207 0.344 0.236 0.379  
Unique 
coverage 
0.033 0.048 0.099 0.076  
Solution consistency:  0.805, solution coverage:  0.757           
 
Bold: contradictory case.    AU = Austria, FR = France, GE = Germany, UK = United Kingdom. 
Raw consistency threshold: 0.764. Next highest consistency score 0.669. 
1 path omitted due to low empirical relevance (see online appendix B, table B3). 
Table 2: Theory evaluation for extensive customization 
 Empirics 
Detected in solution Not detected in solution 
Expected 
scenarios 
RESP*SAL*RES*(VPO + VPL + 
COERC) + RESP*COERC*(VPO + 
sal*VPL) 
N(CUSTOM): 27 (supports theory) 
N(custom): 1  
RESP*COERC*vpo*vpl*(sal + res) + 
RESP*COERC*SAL*res*vpo 
 
N(CUSTOM): 0 
N(custom): 0 (only > 0 delimits theory) 
Not 
expected 
scenarios 
RESP*SAL*coerc*(res + vpo*vpl) + 
resp*sal*VPL*COERC 
 
N(CUSTOM): 11 (extends theory) 
 
N(custom): 2 
resp*(SAL + vpl + coerc) + sal*coerc 
 
 
N(CUSTOM): 13 (suggests overlooked 
explanations) 
N(custom): 22 (supports theory) 
Based on Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 301) and table 1. Bold: Hypotheses 1, 3 and 4: 
RESP*(SAL*RES*(VPO + VPL) + COERC)  CUSTOM. 
Table 3: Theory evaluation for limited customization 
 Empirics 
Detected in solution Not detected in solution 
Expected 
scenarios 
resp*SAL*vpo*COERC + 
resp*coerc*(RES*vpl + sal*vpo*vpl) 
 
 
N(custom): 9 (supports theory) 
N(CUSTOM): 1 
resp*(res*VPO + sal*VPL + sal*COERC + 
VPO*VPL + VPO*COERC) + 
resp*coerc*(SAL*res + VPL) 
N(custom): 10 
N(CUSTOM): 16 (delimits theory) 
Not 
expected 
scenarios 
RESP*sal*res*vpl*coerc 
N(custom): 4 (extends theory) 
 
N(CUSTOM): 0 
RESP*(RES + SAL + VPL + COERC) 
N(custom): 2 (suggests overlooked 
explanations) 
N(CUSTOM): 34 (supports theory) 
Based on Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 301) and table B5. Bold: Hypotheses 2 and 5: resp + resp*coerc  
custom. 
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Figure 1: Country profiles 
 
Average set membership of cases sorted by country.      N = 76. 
Values above 0.5 indicate a feature’s partial to full presence, values below 0.5 its partial or full absence. Density 
and restrictiveness scores were fitted into a scale from 0 to 1. 
Figure 2: Sufficient conditions for extensive customization 
 
Cases situated above the diagonal are consistent. In the upper left quadrant are uncovered cases, in the lower 
right quadrant are contradictory cases. The lower left quadrant is irrelevant (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 
67ff, 308).  
  
